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The Soviet Legacy and its 
Transformation in the 
Russian IT Field
Unlike many other fields of contemporary Russian industry, the IT sec-
tor was not built on the relics of Soviet enterprises but on the significant 
scientific, human, and social resources of the new Russian entrepre-
neurs. Despite this relative independence of the IT field from the tradi-
tional Soviet economy, our respondents live and work in a society that 
is still influenced by the socialist past in several ways.
In this chapter, this influence is considered in terms of the ‘Soviet 
legacy’ and the transformation of this legacy in post-Soviet Russia is dis-
cussed. The beginning of the chapter reflects upon both the constrain-
ing and the enabling aspects of the Soviet heritage, and searches for the 
roots of Russian entrepreneurship in the Soviet era. The remaining parts 
of the chapter describe the transformation of informal practices ranging 
from the Soviet way of using connections to the barter exchanges of the 
transition era and the role of ‘kickbacks’ in the present-day Russian IT 
sector.
Constraining and enabling aspects of the Soviet legacy
At first glance, our respondents seemed to have little to do with the 
Soviet legacy. With only a few exceptions, they had clear identities as 
capitalist entrepreneurs, directors, and managers. Many had indeed 
started their businesses practically from scratch and built modern IT 
enterprises through persistence and hard work. Upon detailed inspec-
tion, however, the continuing presence of the Soviet heritage in the 
present could be detected in relation to social structures, individual 
actors, and their personal networks.1
This presence of the Soviet past has often been called the ‘Soviet 
legacy’, and it is still used in various contexts to explain post-Soviet 
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Russian life, most often as a shorthand way of referring to mainly nega-
tive phenomena.2 Under closer scrutiny, this legacy turns out to be a 
complex phenomenon. 
Alexei Yurchak’s view on Soviet legacy in his study Everything 
Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation (2006) 
helps both to make sense of this complex legacy and to solve the enigma 
of how the seemingly eternal Soviet system could actually fall apart so 
easily and quickly. According to Yurchak this was possible because 
the Soviet system – despite its undeniable flaws and atrocities – also 
contained spaces for creativity and positive experience. Following 
John Austin’s language theory, he differentiates between the ‘conno-
tative’ and ‘performative’ functions of the language used in the ‘late 
socialism’ of Brezhnev’s years. While the connotative function describes 
reality (an enouncement can be true or false), its performative function 
achieves actions in the world through use of language (e.g. taking an 
oath).
According to Yurchak, in late socialism there was a ‘performative 
shift’ in language use from connotative to perfomative dimensions. In 
other words, people participating in May demonstrations, voting or 
giving speeches in Komsomol meetings did not pay attention to the 
connotative dimensions since at issue was not the truthfulness of their 
speech but rather a performing of a ritual. This kind of participation 
in the common rituals of ‘hypernormalized’ language use at public 
meetings enabled citizens to continue functioning within the Soviet 
system, to which, in actuality, they had attitudes varying from hostility 
and indifference to full support of communist ideals. In other words, 
the performative use of language in official contexts allowed them to 
create alternative spaces for action and interests and to develop their 
own cultural activities (including Western rock music) in and outside 
the Soviet system.
On a general level Yurchak’s approach adds an enabling dimension to 
the depictions of the Soviet system and deconstructs the binary views 
consisting of, for example, true believers in communist ideals and pre-
tenders, official and unofficial, or public and private. Seeing the Soviet 
Union through these binarities prevents us from understanding the 
complexity of daily life in late socialism, and, by extension, paradoxes 
such as the communist system as a platform for the emerging new 
Russian entrepreneurs.
In the following sections the Soviet legacy will be discussed in terms 
of structures, actors, and networks, keeping in mind both the constrain-
ing and enabling aspects of this legacy.
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Soviet organizations as platforms for the 
emerging economy
Komsomol
The constraining structural aspects of the Soviet system on the economy 
have already been addressed in the previous chapter. In line with 
Yurchak’s general idea, however, the Soviet era could also be consid-
ered to have contributed to the emergence of the IT field in several 
important ways. These enabling structural aspects of the Soviet legacy 
include the high level of mathematic-technical education, mass educa-
tion of engineers, and the strong tradition in computer-related sciences 
which provided highly trained employees for the emerging IT sector. 
In addition, Soviet era organizational structures, such as Komsomol 
and particularly the high-level research institutions and universities in 
St. Petersburg, formed important contexts for the emerging Russian 
entrepreneurship.
According to Yurchak, the new Russian entrepreneurs had come from 
backgrounds in industry, science, the black market and Komsomol. In 
his view, many new Russian entrepreneurs had already acquired skills, 
knowledge, and competence under the structures of the late social-
ist Soviet system where no official private entrepreneurship existed 
(Yurchak 2002, 2006: 296–8).3 He notes how the success of many of 
the richest Russian businessmen could be traced back to their high-
ranking Komsomol positions and describes how the Youth Centers of 
Komsomol allowed the emerging businessmen an aegis under which to 
put up the starting capital, find contacts, and transform non-cash funds 
into cash:
In the late 1980s, when the reforms of perestroika reached the 
sphere of economics and the Komsomol was allowed to experi-
ment with private business activity, the knowledge, skills, and 
forms of rationality that consituted the late socialist entrepre-
neurial governmentality proved to be of crucial importance in this 
experimentation. At that time many active Komsomol secretaries 
started thinking of themselves as private entrepreneurs and busi-
nessmen, originally without necessarily giving up their identities 
as Komsomol secretaries. Eventually their work in ‘youth centers’ 
and ‘cooperatives’ under the auspices of the Komsomol organiza-
tion turned many Komsomol committees into private firms and 
banks.
(Yurchak 2006: 297–8)
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Yurchak’s account is lent credence by the descriptions of some of our 
respondents who told of having trained in entrepreneurial activities in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s at the ‘Youth Center for Scientific and 
Technical Creativity’ (Nauchno-Tekhnicheskoe Tvorchestvo Molodezhi, 
NTTM) functioning under the auspices of Komsomol: 
At that time the business life started to develop. I organized on the 
basis of my dissertation topic a brigade which at the time was called 
temporary working brigade (vremennaia trudovaia brigada) (…) it was 
organized through NTTM. It was possible to work behind the back 
of the institute [where the respondent was officially employed] and 
arrange the payment through NTTM.
(technical director, p38)
Another of our respondents (director, p39) had similarly already organ-
ized his first, ‘quite complex’ commercial programming project at the 
end of the 1980s, through a Komsomol organization headed by his 
close relative. For the respondent it was evident that at that time this 
organization did not conduct youth-related activities anymore but 
closed different kinds of commercial deals.
Universities and research institutes
Because of the nature of the IT field and the concentration of several 
technical universities and research institutes in Leningrad, for many of 
our respondents their scientific and academic backgrounds and organi-
zations were more important than their Komsomol connections. 
Many respondents also noted their inclination toward and success in 
mathematics and/or computer science in school. All but two had gradu-
ated from university, and several had a licentiate or doctorate degree in 
computing-related sciences. For many, post-graduate studies in univer-
sity or a job at a scientific research institute facilitated the acquisition of 
the human and social capital needed to start a private business.
Company director Egor (p42), for example, started his program-
ming career in a British–Russian joint venture established at a sci-
entific research institute in the early 1990s. Similarly, a well-known 
St. Petersburg software development company was founded in the early 
1990s by young graduates from the university who wanted to earn a 
living with their skills in software design. In less than 20 years the firm 
has grown into an important player in the St. Petersburg IT field.
Another director (p22), with a background in the academic world, 
describes in a vivid manner his scientific activities at the research 
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institute where he was writing his dissertation, and his gradual orient-
ing toward entrepreneurship: 
We made some new discoveries at the institute and everything was 
very interesting and fun. We sat there all night, worked around the 
clock. But then the excitement started to wear off. There were no 
more new discoveries. We ran out of adrenaline and started thinking 
how to live further. At the same time the first personal computers 
appeared and we started to do programming. (…) I already had a 
family and kids whom I should provide for somehow. (…) How could 
a graduate from matmekh [mathematical-technical faculty] make a 
living, one who has studied mathematics, programming and other 
subjects related to exact sciences? (…) Automatically one starts think-
ing of information technology.
(director, p22)
Though at face value this account resembles the starting phases of US 
firms established by study mates from major universities, the analogy 
is only superficial. For a US graduate careers in both the academy or 
in business were normal and customary options – though in both one 
had to face fierce competition. This was not the case in the Russia 
of the 1990s where academic careers seemed to have no future: one 
could not get by, let alone raise a family, based on the meager salaries 
in the academy. For one wishing to start a business, there were no 
models, business schools, institutions, or markets. One had to sink 
or swim.
A well-known example of the symbiosis between academic and busi-
ness life in Russia is Lanit-Terkom,4 one of the biggest software firms 
in St. Petersburg, which was established and is functioning in close 
connection with the St. Petersburg state university. Averin and Dudarev 
(2003: 55) describe the nature of this symbiosis:
The company grew out of the System Programming Department 
(Mathematics and Mechanics Faculty) of the St. Petersburg State 
University, headed by the chief of department, Professor Andrey 
Terekhov. The utilization of the resources of the Mathematics and 
Mechanical Department gave the company an opportunity to 
use the knowledge and scientific background accumulated in the 
department during the decades of the Faculty’s history. Moreover, 
the company has acquired a virtual monopoly over the highly 
qualified and talented staff – the teaching and research staff, as 
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well as the best graduates of the department. At the moment, 
there is no clear boundary between the educational organization 
and the private company. Almost all teaching staff of the System 
Programming Department work for the company. The most tal-
ented students of the department are engaged in the company’s 
projects within the framework of practical research (included in 
the curriculum) starting from 2nd–3rd years of education. Such a 
symbiosis is gainful both for the company and the department. The 
latter receives financial support and the opportunity to place its 
students in a job. Lanit Tercom is able, in turn, to prepare qualified 
personnel and to use the renowned name of the department in its 
marketing policy. 
This is just one example of the survival strategies based on a symbio-
sis between the academic and business worlds in the early years of 
Russian transformation. However, as will become evident in Chapter 6, 
in addition to academic or Komsomol background rooted in the 
Soviet era structures, a wide variety of other development paths for 
new software companies came to light in our data. One of them was 
illustrated by the 37-year-old CEO of a software company employing 
80 people:
There was a factory which had problems and invited me to consult 
them. I looked around and saw that they had both problems and 
money. We suggested that they would give up their old software and 
we would write them a new one. They agreed. We gathered a group 
of people and started a project. In the course of this project we under-
stood that the project would grow bigger than our temporary group 
of people and we founded a company.
(general director, p3)
Entrepreneurship and Soviet legacy
As for the actors, the term Soviet legacy is often evoked in connec-
tion with the continuing role of the ‘Soviet mentality’ in present-day 
Russia. The connotations of the Soviet legacy are mainly negative, 
such as lack of enterprise, sticking to old routines, strict hierarchies, 
and so forth. 
Although in general the IT sector in post-Soviet Russia is thought 
to be the least affected by the Soviet legacy, one respondent remarked 
that the legacy indeed still had an impact on domestic markets because 
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of the ‘red directors’ working with the Soviet mindset and methods of 
management in customer companies:
When placing an order or making a deal there comes the moment 
of decision: to buy or not. Who buys, how and what. And then you 
will run straight into all these red directors.
(general director, p3)
According to another respondent, the question of the Soviet mentality 
was connected to generations and was only relevant to those educated 
in the Soviet era, whereas the new post-socialist generation had new 
values and new problems: 
P4: Today there has grown a completely new generation which is 
already in business life. Currently I deal with people who are not 
solely working in IT firms. They have managers of my age, that is, 
around thirty. We all went to school in the Soviet era.
Q: Do you have different values or do you work differently?
P4: I don’t know, it is difficult to talk about the others. I can only 
say that in my mind those around thirty–thirty-five still remember 
school well. Those who finished school in the beginning of the 1990s 
already have completely new values and they look at life in a com-
pletely different way. In my head, the Soviet legacy still remains.
(general director, p4)
An example of the problems of transformation for the Soviet generation 
was learning how to behave in business. This knowledge consists of, 
for example, working routines and habits and is accumulated over time 
in organizations but is rarely put into writing (cf. Podolny and Baron 
1997). These habitual ways of acting are thus usually not learned from 
books but typically by imitating or interacting with colleagues or a men-
tor, or simply by doing. 
One of our respondents, who had worked for most of his career in 
the Soviet Union, emphasized – in addition to learning new habits – the 
unlearning of the Soviet routines and ways of acting when comparing 
himself with the 20-year-old CEO of a well-known software company:
Q: There are things which are difficult to learn from books, which 
you can only learn through your own experience or by observing the 
experience of your older colleagues. For example, how to think in a 
new, innovative way, how to relate to people, how to conduct busi-
ness. Have you had these kinds of cases?
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P1: Continuously.
Q: Can you tell examples?
P1: You have to understand that I was born in 1951 [year of birth 
has been changed]. At that time you had not even been planned yet, 
probably not even your parents, but I was already crawling, and then 
grew up in the Soviet Union. My whole mentality is Soviet. Imagine 
how hard it was for me to change, how hard it was to transform 
whereas my colleagues, e.g. my colleague in the company NewComp 
[name of firm changed] is now around 30. Have you yet been to 
NewComp?
Q: No.
P1: Well, look. This guy is older than you, about thirty. He started 
his business right after having finished at the institute. For him this 
is completely different. Of course I keep an eye on him and my 
other competitors. They are my teachers. I watch how they conduct 
business, how they regard their colleagues, how they organize every-
thing. And I try to apply this (…) For them it all came naturally, but 
I had to get rid of the birthmarks of socialism.
(general director, p1)
The same respondent illustrated the moral tension between socialist 
and capitalist mindsets with the dilemma caused by the installation of 
a new computerized system in his company to monitor workers:
For me it was very difficult to start [in the company] a computerized 
access control system, which records the time of arriving and leaving 
the workplace. Now I know who came later, who has not worked 40 
hours a week. It was incredible, how difficult the implementation 
was for me. I felt as if I was being torn into pieces. What would the 
people think?
(general director, p1)
Various techniques of controlling and monitoring workers were cer-
tainly also used both in the Soviet Union and other industrialized 
countries. The quote above thus rather illustrates the difficulties in the 
transition from the position of ‘scientific rank-and-file worker’ to that 
of a capitalist company owner and CEO, and the problems and ten-
sions in balancing between the moral requirements of two conflicting 
sociopolitical orders. 
There is, however, also another way of looking at the Soviet mental-
ity. The studies of daily life survival strategies (e.g. Lonkila 1997), 
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networks (Ledeneva 1998), and the abovementioned research by Yurchak 
(2002, 2006) suggest that the allegedly passive homo sovieticus could in 
the interstices of the system find spaces and possibilities for complex and 
innovative maneuvers. In fact, navigating in the opportunity structures 
of the late socialist and perestroika era allows us ‘to speak about entre-
preneurship in a context in which there was no market based private 
business per se’ (Yurchak 2002; see also Shmulyar Gréen 2009). 
In a similar vein Alf Rehn and Saara Taalas (2004) claim that the stu-
dents of entrepreneurship have a lesson to learn about Soviet society, 
where, due to an ideological bias in research, entrepreneurship was not 
considered to exist at all. The authors even go as far as to claim that 
‘The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics might be seen as the most 
entrepreneurial society ever’ and maintain that the Soviet system basi-
cally forced all citizens to become ‘micro-entrepreneurs’ in everyday 
life. They detect entrepreneurship and risk taking in unexpected set-
tings also outside the business and market contexts and consider the 
blat networks to have been the main arena for entrepreneurial activity 
in the Soviet Union (Rehn and Taalas 2004).5 Blat networks in the Soviet 
Union and their transformation in post-Soviet Russia will be the focus 
of the next two sections.
Blat: Transformation of the Soviet-era networking practice
Blat denotes the Soviet habit of using personal relations to direct public 
resources to private uses.6 There are no exact English translations, but 
expressions such as ‘using connections’, ‘pulling strings’, and so forth 
give a rough understanding of the contents of the term. In this sec-
tion the blat system and its transformation in post-Soviet Russia are 
described both according to Ilja Srubar’s comparative investigation as 
well as Alena Ledeneva’s studies of blat (1998, 2008, 2009).
In his article on the actual nature of the socialist system, War der 
reale Sozialismus moderne? (Was the Real Socialism Modern?), Ilja Srubar 
(1991) presents an accurate theoretical description of the role of social 
networks in a socialist system. Though Srubar’s analysis is based on 
comparison of studies of countries which made up the former Soviet 
bloc (not including the Soviet Union itself), the comparative aspect of 
the study strengthens the power of his argument. Srubar manages to 
show a similar kind of relationship between the socialist system and 
social networks in historically and culturally varied national contexts.
According to Srubar, the power monopoly of the Communist Party 
combined with the socialist shortage economy created a mechanism 
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of social integration which was based on social networks and was 
specific to real socialist countries. In the shortage economy in addition 
to money the citizens also needed information about how and where to 
find goods in short supply. These goods and information were obtained 
through networks which developed into an alternative distribution sys-
tem. Within the networks, an atmosphere of mutual solidarity emerged 
out of the reciprocal exchange relations, but it was limited to those who 
had something to barter, such as access to socialist property. These net-
works functioned parallel to the official system and were tolerated by 
the party since they compensated for the flaws of the shortage economy 
by diverting people’s interests from politics to consumption. In addi-
tion, they functioned as a means of control since the party’s tolerance 
for them could always be withdrawn.
While the shortage economy forced citizens to turn to their personal 
relations in order to get by, the party power monopoly produced a 
non-transparent state bureaucracy, the decisions of which could not be 
predicted by citizens. A position in this bureaucracy represented capital 
which could be traded through personal networks. This mechanism of 
social integration had a profound influence on the individual’s social 
identity. Citizens in real socialism divided the world into the trustworthy 
‘us’ – that is, one’s personal network – and potentially hostile ‘others.’ 
Instead of general social solidarity, this integration mechanism produced 
fragmented solidarity within ‘an archipelago of networks’ and a world-
view where moral norms applied to one’s own circle were different from 
those applied to outsiders, for whom there was no moral way to success. 
A neighbor’s wealth, for example, was attributed either to his political 
privileges or illegal activities in redistribution networks (Srubar 1991).
Parallel to Srubar, but independently of his research, Alena Ledeneva 
(1998, 2008, 2009, see also Lomnitz 1988) has studied blat in detail in 
the Soviet Union. Ledeneva bases her work on extensive field research 
and interviews filled with rich descriptions of the content, functioning, 
and practices of the blat ties.
Importantly for the themes of this book, Ledeneva defines blat pre-
cisely with the help of the notion of personal networks, as ‘the use of 
personal networks for obtaining goods and services in short supply 
and for circumventing formal procedures. Blat networks channeled an 
alternative currency – an informal exchange of favors – that introduced 
elements of the market into the planned economy and loosened up the 
rigid constraints of the political regime’ (Ledeneva 2009, 257–8). 
However, though blat practices were conducted through personal net-
works, they were not identical, since the latter also had other functions, 
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such as sociability. These functions were difficult to separate because 
‘blat merged with patterns of sociability to such an extent that people 
were unable to distinguish between friendship and the use of friend-
ship. The boundaries became particularly blurred as the exchanged 
favors were favors of a particular kind – “favors of access”’ (Ledeneva 
2009: 258).
Blat had an ambivalent character since on the one hand it was 
necessary for the functioning of the system, but on the other hand it 
undermined the system and corrupted common morals through its 
very existence. Though blat practices made use of state resources, the 
state was dependent on the informal ways of distributing the scarce 
resources. The informal ways could not be discussed publicly, which 
created a double morality in Soviet society:
Thus blat became an open secret of Soviet socialism, well known 
but banned from political or academic discourse. The blat system 
of exchange was founded in the possibility of extending favors at 
the expense of state property. The dubious nature of state property 
and the repressive nature of the Soviet state contributed to pervasive 
practices of cheating and outwitting the state: blat and other forms 
of diverting state property, smuggling out (vynos), false reporting 
(pripiski), stealing, or absenteeism. These practices indicate not only 
the popular view of the Soviet state as parasitic, due to its highly 
exploitative nature, but also the mutual tolerance between the state 
and the citizens, especially in the Brezhnev era.
(Ledeneva 2008: 123–4)
Ledeneva shows how the inability of the Soviet economy to produce 
enough goods and services of decent quality, such as food products, 
medicine, cars, apartments, and so forth, led to resorting to obtaining 
them ‘by blat’ (po blatu). The examples of blat practices abound: an 
acquaintance working at a warehouse could arrange access to goods 
in short supply ‘under the counter’, a contact in the army ranks could 
arrange for avoiding the two to three years of military service, a doctor 
acquaintance in the hospital could arrange jumping the queue for better 
treatment or an operation, and so on. 
Blat contacts penetrated the whole Soviet society: their amount was 
large and scale wide, but the common denominator was the use of 
social ties in order to gain access to state property or services and to 
use them for the private purposes of one’s own circle. Ledeneva (1998: 
39–58) distinguished blat from its ‘extended family’, including bribery, 
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corruption, second economy, and patronage. For example, the differ-
ence between blat and bribery or corruption was that the latter were 
based on straightforward deals involving buying services with money. 
Characteristic of the blat services, on the other hand, were the long-term 
cultivation of relationships, a special vocabulary, and a refined etiquette 
of behavior where the straightforward offering of money could be con-
sidered insulting. This meant, among other things, that blat practices 
could penetrate areas where use of money could not.
Ledeneva also discusses the differences between blat and the various 
notions of ‘informal’ (unofficial, second, hidden, parallel, shadow, etc.) 
economy. She concludes that blat cannot be adequately analyzed in 
terms of informal economic practices since it implies relations of reci-
procity within personal networks, rather than market-type exchanges 
and activities oriented toward profit, on which informal economic 
practices are often based. In her mind, the study of blat requires a socio-
cultural analysis of personal ties and their impact on blat exchanges.
Blat exchanges were based on reciprocal obligations. Ledeneva employs 
an idea borrowed from Pierre Bourdieu, according to whom the partners 
in a gift exchange take part in a collective ‘misrecognition game.’ In this 
game, the exchange of gifts can be perceived as altruistic only because of 
the time gap between the original gift and the countergift (see Chapter 7 
for a closer account of reciprocal obligations). 
Though Ledeneva’s observations are in many ways extremely relevant 
to this study, the differences between blat exchanges and the exchanges 
dealt with in this book should be made clear. First, despite the misrec-
ognition game, the blat system had in general a negative reputation: 
no Soviet citizen could have publicly admitted to having engaged in 
it. Partly because of this nature, asking a blat favor was often psycho-
logically difficult (Ledeneva 1998: 156). This was not the case for our 
respondents with everyday exchanges of small favors, advice, helping 
out and so forth, most of which did not include a morally doubtful 
aspect. Second, and related to the previous point, blat transactions were 
about granting favor of access to state services or property, which were 
redirected to private use, whereas the majority of the favors and services 
dealt with in this book do not have that character. 
Blat in post-Soviet Russia
In her later work, Ledeneva (2008) notes three major changes in blat 
practices. The first change concerns the expansion of the money econ-
omy, which has diminished the need for blat in personal consumption. 
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Second, the privatization of the economy has changed the nature of 
‘favors of access’ granted by officials. Instead of exchanging favors of 
access to socialist property for access to another distribution system, in 
the 1990s these favors came to be about privatizing state resources and 
converting them into private capital through various licenses and per-
missions. These exchanges between the state and business sector often 
turned into outright corruption. Third, the scale of blat exchanges has 
started to predominantly serve business instead of personal consump-
tion (Ledeneva 2008: 132–3).
However, Ledeneva admits that informal contacts still remained a 
priority where money was not accepted as a means of exchange (1998: 
180), and notes that blat was still used in state education and employ-
ment (1998: 206). Anna-Maria Salmi (2006: 38–9) adds to this list health 
services and job searches, which still offer much space for blat-type 
activities.
Ledeneva’s (2009) recent assessment of the role of blat in post-Soviet 
Russia in 2009 is in line with these results. With the progress of mon-
etary relations, blat has lost its relevance in everyday consumption 
but is still significant in, for example, the labor market, health care, 
and education. In her national representative survey conducted by the 
Levada Center in 2007, she asked respondents to define blat by choos-
ing as many prompts as necessary: 
18 percent of respondents indicated that the term is out of use and 
five percent noted that the word blatnoi means criminal – that is, 
has returned to its original pre-revolutionary meaning. At least a 
quarter of respondents associated blat with an exchange of favors 
(22 percent) or best described by a proverb ‘I scratch your back, you 
scratch mine’ (ty-mne, ia-tebe) (15 percent). With regard to formal 
constraints, the responses were: ‘circumvention of formal rules and 
procedures’ (17 percent), ‘problem solving’ (12 percent), ‘blat is the 
necessity in order to give a bribe’ (six percent) or gain access to 
administrative resources (four percent). Tellingly, only seven percent 
of respondents found it difficult to answer this question and there 
were respondents who offered their own definitions (including 
‘blat is higher than under Stalin’ and ‘blat is a leftover of socialism’ 
(izderzhki sotsializma) as well as ‘blat is the corrupt system, the whole 
industry’ and ‘blat is life’.
(Ledeneva 2009: 262)
Whatever the exact definition, blat still seems to have a central place 
in post-Soviet society since 66 percent of Ledeneva’s respondents 
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considered it either widespread (28 percent) or rather widespread (38 
percent) in their own city or region.
In the following text the post-Soviet blat is illustrated by our inter-
views. Due to the nature of our data and methods, these illustrations 
are not claimed to be generalizable. At the end of this chapter their 
relevance will be evaluated through comparison with other studies of 
the topic. 
The description by a St. Petersburg IT manager of the vanishing of blat 
practices seems to lend support to Ledeneva’s conclusions. According to 
the respondent, the pressure of efficiency in capitalist enterprise does 
not leave room for blat in present-day Russia:
P1: In socialism, a person working as a butcher can get a carcass of 
an animal. Another person drives a taxi. A third one is a doctor and 
can obtain medical services. The butcher cuts the best pieces off the 
carcass and sells them at a normal state regulated price to the taxi 
driver or doctor. (…) And the bones he brings to the shop and sells 
to us engineers (…) Now, if the butcher needs to go someplace by car, 
he phones the taxi driver who drives him from one place to another. 
And the doctor will take care of him.
Q: And how does this work today?
P1: Today you go to the shop and buy. Anything is for sale.
Q: So where is there blat today?
P1: I told you an example of Soviet blat. Today it works on the level 
of old relations. But I believe it will soon disappear. Slowly blat will 
disappear. 
Q: For example, in IT, in outsourcing there is almost no blat?
P1: In practice not. IT functions as other sectors. I can for example, 
appoint my brother as a manager in my firm. And he will turn out to 
be a good for nothing, he can do nothing. What will my colleagues 
say? We are trying to make money, what will they say?
(general director, p1)
Parts of this quote were questioned by other respondents, however. 
Though IT companies working with foreign customers were generally 
considered blat free, they too had to deal with blat-type phenomena if 
also operating on domestic markets. Moreover, in certain cases blat-type 
arrangements may be used either as an alternative to or in combination 
with bribing. 
The interpretation of the term blat seemed to be connected to the 
age of the respondents. While elderly respondents, such as the one 
describing the blat relations among the butcher, taxi driver and doctor, 
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considered blat in line with Ledeneva’s account, marketing manager 
Valentina (p15), who was under 30 years of age, regarded blat as a syno-
nym for the informal use of social relations in general. According to 
development manager Viktor (p17, 33 years) ‘blat is not so relevant for 
young people. Many of them do not know, cannot imagine what blat 
means.’ The hesitation of still another of our respondents, a director 
under 30 years of age, lends support to this:
Blat – it is a tough word. If you define it formally … how would you 
define it formally?
(director, p10)
Varied opinions were expressed about the existence, nature, and specificity 
of post-Soviet blat. A director-owner of his own company, aged 50 (CEO, 
p16) – who thus had his own experiences of Soviet blat – compared blat 
to ‘protection.’ A technical director under 30 (p11) saw blat as a Russian 
version of a universal way of acting that is not inherently immoral. 
Despite these variations, a common view was that blat still exists in 
the public sector and big state-owned companies. In particular tenders 
organized by the state-related actors were considered to be impossible 
to win without blat, bribes, or both. The founder of a young and small 
company expressed this explicitly: 
We [respondent’s firm] probably have not yet reached the level where 
you participate in tenders, but I know that they are indeed won by 
those who have acquaintances. If, for example, the five leading firms 
of my field try as hard as they can, the tender will be won by those 
with connections anyway.
(technical director, p20)
Another respondent doing business with state structures refused to 
answer this question (‘confidential’), but the third respondent, working 
in system integration, confirms the quote above:
In fact, in some market segments it [blat] definitely exists. This was 
particularly visible in system integration which is closely related to 
the state purchases. It is practically impossible to win a tender with-
out corresponding connections, friends, acquaintances, kinfolk. But 
this is actually no secret. I am not revealing any secret.
(marketing manager, p18)
When asked about concrete examples of present-day blat, in addition 
to state structures, employment by blat was mentioned. Marketing 
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director Svetlana (p6) also referred to the arranging of study places 
by blat – a phenomenon about which there are a lot of rumors and 
anecdotal evidence from both the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia: 
Q: In the Soviet era blat relations were still used. Do they still func-
tion, does blat exist nowadays? 
P4: In state structures it stays as it was. In my opinion there is no 
doubt about this. But in business – this is a complex question. It 
is clear that parents try to push their children forward through all 
means. This is a normal parental instinct, and here blat functions. 
Another matter is that it functions precisely as an exchange of favors. 
I have an example in mind, where a big boss arranged for his chil-
dren to work in different companies. With this it happens often that 
the child does not correspond to the requirements presented by the 
companies. But the child was employed precisely because dad had 
given in one way or another a favor to this company. And so this 
happened in full scale. As for business, I think that in big companies 
this also functions, but not in small ones. Here I doubt it.
Q: Why?
P4: In small companies people are visible (na vidu), everything is 
counted and the budget is small. If a small company has to employ 
someone to win a state organized tender, this causes a financial 
calculation: How much do we lose by employing this kid and how 
much do we win by getting this order.
(general director, p4)
In all, despite the significant changes compared to Soviet-era blat, the 
present-day Russian society and economy still seem to leave room for 
informal practices more or less reminiscent of blat. Even though these 
practices may be neither as pervasive nor culturally specific as in the 
Soviet Union, they still continue to exist, particularly in the public sec-
tor and state-controlled parts of the economy. 
Barter: A transitory phenomenon of exchange
Where blat was mainly a phenomenon of the Soviet system, barter 
(non-monetary exchange between companies) peaked in the late 1990s 
(see Figure 4.1).7 Barter will be briefly described here as an example 
of informal socioeconomic practices of the transition era based on 
personal connections. According to Caroline Humphrey (2000a), post-
Soviet barter was a unique phenomenon on the global scale, since never 
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before had an economy as big as Russia’s operated to a large extent 
through barter.
Though barter exchanges took place in the Soviet Union as well, 
according to David Woodruff (1999), the ‘barter of the bankrupt’ of 
the transition era was a qualitatively different phenomenon with new 
causes and new consequences. In his mind the new barter was not only 
an anomaly threatening the implementation of the market reforms, 
but also a sign of how the reformers had neglected the central role of 
monetary consolidation in state building.
According to Ivanenko and Mikheyev (2002; see also Clarke 2000: 
178–9), in the background of barter there were the structural weaknesses 
and bottlenecks of the socialist system. The Soviet economy had built 
a massive industrial production system which was connected to an 
inflexible and one-sided distribution, trade, and banking network. Big 
production plants, for example, were planned to serve certain custom-
ers and get raw material from certain producers. When one part of the 
logistic chain saw trouble, this was reflected in the whole chain:
For example, as steel producers in the Ural region found the demand 
for their products falling, they became unable to pay suppliers in 
cash and offered metal products for coal. The coal mines, being 
unable to find alternative customers along the existing transport 
lines, had to agree.









Figure 4.1 The share of barter in Russian industrial sales, 1992–2007, %
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In addition to leading to barter between companies, the demonetiza-
tion of the post-Soviet Russian economy in the 1990s also affected 
households, since some salaries were paid in non-monetary forms (see 
Clarke 2000: 189–94). Because the retail trade and provision of con-
sumer services were, however, mainly monetary, individual households 
had to react to the new situations either by lowering their standard of 
living (Clarke 2000) or by selling the goods received at the workplace 
on streets and highways or in marketplaces.
It is not our intention to review the large research literature on bar-
ter here (see for example Seabright 2000a; Ivanenko and Mikheyev 
2002; Woodruff 2000). It suffices to say that barter was not only an 
economic but also a social phenomenon operating through social rela-
tions (Seabright 2000b: 8). Consequently, the studies most relevant for 
this book are those analyzing the dynamics of barter on the micro level 
(Humphrey 2000a, b; Ledeneva 2000, 2006; Clarke 2000). 
Though barter took place between companies and organizations, the 
practical deals were handled by individuals, and the barter arrange-
ments and exchange chains were often built upon complex chains of 
exchanging parties (Ledeneva 2000: 298–317, 2006: 115–41). These 
arrangements were partly founded upon already existing networks, 
and partly they created new relationships balancing between trust and 
coercion (Humphrey 2000a, b). Most importantly, the majority of the 
barter deals were not conducted directly between the exchanging firms 
but through middlemen (Ledeneva 2006: 125). 
In actual fact this means that the Russian economy in the 1990s 
formed an immense network consisting of the companies (and their 
workers who were paid in kind) and the middlemen mediating the 
exchanges. These networks, on the base of which Russia’s current form 
of capitalism was partly built, relied on personal contacts:
[G]ood personal contacts are vital for making the offsets agreed upon 
between the parties, for designing schemes, and for making these 
schemes work. Negotiation skills may help to acquire weak links 
for the schemes – partners engaged on a rather short-term basis – but 
it is personal contacts that provide strong links in these schemes, 
those characterized by absolute trust or long-term technological 
partnership.
(Ledeneva 2006: 138–9)
In their criticism of the presuppositions of the transition debate, Michael 
Burawoy and Katherine Verdery (1999b) have stated that in spite of a 
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linear transition from socialism to a market economy, development in 
Russia will most probably be an uneven development of different sec-
tors of society with occasional ‘backlashes’. Though barter will hardly 
reach the prevalence of the 1990s again, there have been some signs of 
the return of barter practices on a smaller scale after the beginning of 
the economic crisis in 2008. Belchenko (2008), for example, describes 
how certain companies in the Krasnoyarsk region in the beginning of 
December 2008 paid their workers’ salaries in the company’s products 
instead of money.8
Otkat: The role of ‘kickbacks’ in the Russian economy
While blat was mainly a Soviet era phenomenon, barter peaked at the 
end of the 1990s, after which it slowly disappeared. Instead of blat and 
barter, many of our respondents mentioned the rise of otkat, an expres-
sion for a post-Soviet form of corruption. It roughly corresponds to 
the English word ‘kickback’ and, as the Russian discussants are eager 
to note, is not a particularity of the Russian economy: the first ‘Anti-
Kickback Act’ was passed in the US already in 1946 and was amended 
in 1960, 1986, and 1994 (Denisov 2005).9
Otkat is a noun from the verb otkatit’ (roll away, roll back). In actual 
terms it means that a company participating in a public tender promises 
to ‘roll back’ a certain amount of the contract sum to the organizers of 
the tender. Otkat is therefore a form of corruption that is not specific 
only to Russia, and there is no reason to believe that foreign firms 
operating in Russia would not use otkat. What seems to be particular 
however – concluding from our interviews, the views of Russian observ-
ers (e.g. Denisov 2005; Gorbachev 2007) and other information about 
corrupted practices in Russia – is the prevalence of otkat in Russian 
business. 
This prevalence is in line with the general information on corrupted 
practices in the Russian economy and society, and its actual practices 
are spiritedly debated both in Russian journals and on Internet forums. 
Giving otkat is often euphemized as ‘personal bonus’ or ‘discount’, and 
the negotiations concerning the deal may be conducted using language 
which at every point in time could be interpreted as referring either to 
a completely transparent and legal deal or a kickback agreement:
In the beginning of the discussion it is very good to test the waters 
with the potential recipient of otkat with the phrases with double 
meaning: ‘For you it will be very profitable (vygodno) to deal with 
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our company’, ‘we are ready to make concessions (poiti navstrechu) so 
that you would choose our company’, ‘a reduction may be arranged 
in any form convenient (udobno) for you’.
(Gorbachev 2007)
During such conversation the rich Russian language gives plenty of 
opportunities to interpret the word ‘you’ as ‘you personally’ instead of 
‘your company’, and the well-reflected pauses of speech, change of into-
nation or tone give an impression of the hidden message behind what 
is meant to be a transparent deal between the representatives of the two 
parties, and give the opponent chances to express understanding of this 
message (Gorbachev 2007).
Though otkat is not a big problem in the IT companies operating 
mainly in foreign markets, many respondents mentioned it in discus-
sions about the transformation of blat in post-Soviet Russia and Russian 
domestic markets:
Q: Sometimes in the Soviet era blat relations were used. Does this 
still function?
P9: It only turned into corruption. Of course it functions.
Q: Have you run into some examples?
P9: Not personally, because I work with foreign business and there 
this does not exist in general. But in Russia – of course. I don’t think 
you will find a line of business which functions without otkat and 
all this.
(director, p9)
Otkat was taken up by several respondents in connection with tenders 
which, according to the respondents, were won either through relations 
or otkat, or both. According to another respondent (director, p29) who 
had worked with Russian companies on domestic markets for a long 
time, tenders are rarely won based on ‘objective’ criteria, but with con-
nections and, lacking connections, by otkat. At the moment his firm did 
not participate in tender, considering it a waste of time and resources 
because the result was predestined:
The firm will do a huge amount of preparation, but the tender will 
be won by a crazy proposal only because of connections.
(director, p29)
Another respondent, a technical director working with big companies, 
told openly of the various forms of otkat, claiming that in practice all 
68 Networks in the Russian Market Economy
state officials (chinovniki) take bribes, and still another admitted that his 
firm had been involved in otkat. 
Obtaining reliable information about the prevalence of otkat (or blat 
or barter) is understandably hampered by the several problems related 
to data and methods. One necessarily simplistic and limited way of 
approaching the subject is to examine the prevalence of these terms in 
the Russian media. Figure 4.2 is based on a scrutiny of selected Russian 
newspapers and magazines published in 1992–2007 and stored in the 
Integrum database. It shows how in the texts of central Russian newspa-
pers and magazines the term otkat has become more common during the 
2000s while the use of barter and blat has diminished (see Figure 4.2).10
Though the frequency of these terms in the media is not in direct 
correspondence with the occurrence of the phenomena in Russian 
society, it is noteworthy that the estimate of the peak of barter in 
Figure 4.1 is quite similar to the frequency of the term in printed media 
in Figure 4.2. 
The pervasiveness of corruption in Russia has also been addressed 
by Russian presidents – up to now without results. The latest data by 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index11 indicate 
a fall in Russia’s ranking from 121 in 2006 to 143 in 2007, and to 147 
in 2008, while in 2008 the US was eighteenth, the UK sixteenth and 
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Figure 4.2 The frequency of use of the terms blat, barter and otkat in selected 
Russian newspapers 1998–2007
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Figure 4.3 shows the deterioration of Russia’s ranking during the 
2000s despite the anticorruption speeches and campaigns. Russia’s clos-
est neighbors in the index in 1997 were Pakistan and Columbia and in 
2008 Indonesia and Togo.
The aim of this study is not the analysis of corruption in Russia. 
Therefore the processes and structures at the base of the corruption 
index rankings will not be investigated in detail (see, e.g. Lovell et al. 
2001). However, even without a detailed analysis one may draw the 
conclusion that Yeltsin, Putin, and Medvedev have not succeeded in 
weeding out wide-scale corruption, which seems to be a systemic char-
acteristic of the society and economy, from Russia.
The referrals to corruption and illegal or ambiguous practices in 
the interviews were mostly related to dealing with state structures. 
Understandably, most respondents did not clarify these things to the 
interviewer either because of unwillingness or because they were not 
responsible for communicating with these structures within their com-
panies. The following interview quote shows how a question not origi-
nally meant to refer only to state structures was interpreted as such by 
the respondent and how the native Russian interviewer read between 
the lines of the respondent’s reply:
Q: Have you sometime been in situations in business, where you 
could not solve the problem in a formal way and you had to lean on 
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Figure 4.3 Ranking of Russia in Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index
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P20: Again here it is a question related to state structures. I do not 
know how this all goes, I do not deal with these things.
Q: Do you mean bribes? OK, it is not a secret to anyone, what 
there … Is this related to accounting?
P20: No, not to accounting. I will not answer this question. 
(technical director, p20) 
One of the few respondents who overtly told of illegal practices such 
as tax evasion was working in a small company employing only a few 
people and in a field representing a small fraction of the ICT sector.12 
In his field one did not, in the early 2000s, work on written contracts 
but on the basis of ‘gentlemen’s agreements’, because ‘practically all 
money goes over the taxman’s head’. According to the respondent prob-
ably one ruble out of 20 was reported to the taxman in falsified official 
contracts, the monitoring of which was based on social control and the 
reputations of actors within the small and specialized markets. Another 
respondent lent support to this view, stressing the similarity of the busi-
ness environment for all Russian companies:
[I]n general, companies work in a similar manner, which is defined 
by the legal environment. The legislation of the Russian federation 
contains directly both the juridical and financial aspects: taxes, 
banks and so forth. And I know that up to this day all firms work by 
and large according to the same model. There are very few firms that 
pay full taxes.
(general director, p4)
According to still another respondent (general director, p48) working in 
telecommunications it is not a secret that most of the telecommunica-
tions technology sold in St. Petersburg is ‘gray’, that is, not imported 
according to legal customs regulations.
Because of the particular nature of the software design sector (rela-
tively small turnover, large share of human and educational capital, 
orientation abroad), extortion and other forms of organized crime did 
not emerge as important issues in the interviews. A programming com-
pany is less vulnerable to extortion or takeover by criminal groups than, 
say, a distribution chain of food products. However, particularly in the 
1990s, keeping a low profile was considered to be a precaution against 
these practices, and probably also against the taxman: 
Until 1999 our company was not visible anywhere (…) But the 
level of criminality was at that time much higher than today – thank 
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God. And we did not want to be seen, to be known of or heard of 
here.
(general director, p1)
Things were different in the hardware business. Technical director 
Kirill (p38) remembered a meeting among Russian ICT companies at 
the beginning of the 2000s. A merry group of software designers was 
approached by an entrepreneur in the hardware business, who smiling 
sadly told the entrepreneurs ‘How well things are with you, nobody 
beats up or kills anyone’. (Nu, kak u vas khorosho, nikto nikogo ne izbivaet, 
nikto nikogo ne ubivaet.)
Other informal practices in the post-Soviet Russian 
economy
In her book How Russia Really Works. The Informal Practices That Shaped 
Post-Soviet Politics and Business (2006) Alena Ledeneva extends her 
studies of blat to other forms of informal practices in post-Soviet Russia 
which have gained ground parallel to blat losing its central role. She 
defines informal practices ‘as people’s regular strategies to manipulate 
or exploit formal rules by enforcing informal norms and personal obli-
gation in formal contexts. Such strategies involve bending both formal 
rules and informal norms, or navigating between these constraints, by 
following some and breaking others’ (Ledeneva 2008: 119, 2006).
The informal practices include, in addition to the barter dealt with 
earlier in this book, the use of ‘black PR’ and kompromat (gathering and 
fabricating blackmail files for political or business purposes), the prin-
ciple of krugovaia poruka (joint responsibility and mutual obligations 
of a closed social circle), double accountancy, financial scheming, and 
alternative law enforcement. As with blat, the nature of these practices 
is considered ambivalent, both reproducing and undermining the post-
Soviet society and economy:
I argue that informal practices were an integral part of the post-
socialist transformation. Informal practices adjusted to and were 
shaped by formal and informal constraints: they supported for-
mal rules and informal norms but also subverted them; they rap-
idly accommodated legal changes but also created an obstacle to 
further change; they were beneficial for certain individuals but also 
made them hostages of the system. These practices were not simply 
illegal but integrated the law into political, media, and business 
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technologies, often manipulatively. Similarly, they did not simply 
follow or contradict informal norms but relied on some of them and 
played one set of norms against the other.
(Ledeneva 2006: 190)
Ledeneva’s illuminative case studies describe, among other things, 
different types of sanctions as part of the informal practices:
The first area encompasses a set of administrative sanctions, that can 
be organized through well-placed links to official structures such as 
regional administrations, the tax inspectorate, tax police, the fire 
department, and the departments of sanitation and public health. 
It is possible to arrange for a firm’s access to water, gas, electricity, 
and sewers to be cut off by the regional authorities on the pretext of 
arrears. These techniques have been practiced widely and remain one 
of the most common ways of neutralizing opponents.
(Ledeneva 2006: 172–3)
Another example of informal practices presented by Ledeneva is the 
possibility of influencing official investigations and judicial proceedings 
in Russia. Law cases and investigations can be opened or closed by influ-
encing judges, prosecutors, or police, and if unfavorable judgments are 
passed, their enforcement can be prevented (Ledeneva 2006: 174).
Informal practices are conducted both in politics and business – and 
at the intersection of the two spheres. Ledeneva cites a case published 
in Kommersant in 2001 where as part of an anti-black PR action a 
St. Petersburg agency offered money for 21 press outlets to publish 
commercial disinformation (a nonexistent company opening a 
nonexistent shop at a nonexistent address) as an editorial form rather 
than as a paid advertisement. As a result, 13 outlets agreed to publish 
this information as an article for prepayment, three recommended to 
publish it as advertising, four wanted additional information and one 
published it for free (Ledeneva 2006: 35, citing Kadik and Pyanykh 
2001).
Ledeneva’s examples of kompromat contain, among others, cases of 
Russian businessmen’s and politicians’ suspicious political activities 
(abuse of office and power); shady and often illegal economic activi-
ties (e.g. misuse of budget funds, capital flight, giving or accepting of 
bribes); criminal activities (contract killings), and compromising details 
of private life (spending habits, sexual orientation) (Ledeneva 2006: 
58–90).
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Krugovaia poruka refers to ‘a pattern in behavior or relationship 
according to which a person is part of a bigger social unit (a group, net-
work, family, or clan) rather than an isolated human being driven by 
self-interest. Such a social unit is “tied up” by joint responsibility and 
mutual obligations’ (Ledeneva 2006: 90). The genealogy of krugovaia 
poruka has long roots in both prerevolutionary Russian and Soviet his-
tory and its forms have been continuously changing and adapting to 
the new circumstances. In post-Soviet Russia the principle of krugovaia 
poruka can be found both in politics and business, often connecting 
the two spheres as with the ‘Mabetex case’ against Pavel Borodin, the 
Kremlin property chief, whose bailing out of Swiss prison was consid-
ered to be due to his inside knowledge of Kremlin affairs reaching up to 
Yeltsin and his inner circle (Ledeneva 2006: 107).
Similar to blat, krugovaia poruka overlaps with the use of personal 
networks, but is not identical to it. It underlines that in Russian politi-
cal culture:
–The individual is viewed as a part of a bigger system (such as a circle 
of svoi liudi [one’s own people] or a network of interests) rather than 
isolated and working for oneself
– Individuals are encouraged to seek protection and to repay favors.
– Long-term relationships are kept and nurtured, thus creating 
mutual dependency rather than operating on the basis of short-term 
individual gain.
– Governance is by flexible ethical standards rather than by the strict 
rule of law.
(Ledeneva 2006: 113)
Ledeneva also offers a detailed account of a variety of financial schem-
ing related to double invoicing, capital flight, tax evasion, or tax 
avoidance which the participants see as necessary survival strategies 
for protecting themselves against turbulent and changing institutional 
environments, corrupted authorities, and the arbitrariness of the tax 
inspection. On the systemic level the financial schemes, however, create 
a vicious cycle, undermining formal institutions and decreasing their 
effectiveness (Ledeneva 2006: 161).
Prevalence of criminal practices in the Russian economy
Does the long list of informal practices referred to in this chapter 
imply that the Russian economy is completely dominated by illegal 
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practices or run by dubious, half-criminal groups? Due to its qualita-
tive nature, this study cannot answer the question of the prevalence 
of illegal and informal practices in the Russian economy. However, 
the interviews suggest that most prone to corruption, otkat and 
other informal practices are the IT firms dealing with the hardware 
trade and those doing business with state-owned or state-controlled 
sectors. 
These conclusions are supported by Chachin (2008), who cites a 
report by the Commission of Telecommunications and Information 
Technology of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. 
According to the Commission, the state has not been able to monitor 
the observation of customs and tax regulations. Therefore the majority 
of Russian IT imports are effectuated by ‘gray schemes’:
[A]voiding value-added taxes and customs (…) leads to the offering of 
‘gray’ IT products to markets 30–35 percent cheaper than is possible 
for entrepreneurs who pay full taxes and customs. As a consequence 
all Russian and foreign firms working in Russia are forced to play 
by the rules, with which many disagree, but which they have to 
follow.
(Chachin 2008)
Moreover, the commission notes how the equal level of social security 
payments in all fields of industry particularly hampers the competitive-
ness of the labor-intensive IT sector, forcing Russian IT firms to use 
‘gray’ schemes of payment. This distorts the accounting and makes 
Russian firms ‘untransparent’ to foreign investors. 
The role of illegal and criminal aspects of the Russian economy have 
been also analyzed by Vadim Volkov (2002) who has proposed an 
interpretation stressing the civilizing effect of capitalism on organized 
crime in post-Soviet Russia. Volkov does not deal with organized crime 
as a deviant phenomenon, but sees it instead from a neoinstitutionalist 
perspective as a response to the requirements of the emerging Russian 
markets. For him, organized Russian crime was not a rampage of blood-
thirsty killers, but the organization and commodification of violence 
by the ‘violent entrepreneurs’ – often called ‘Russian mafia’ by other 
writers. 
According to Volkov’s theory, the Russian state in the 1990s was 
fragmented and weak. It had lost both the fiscal monopoly and the 
monopoly of force, and could not secure the property rights or other 
needs of the emerging Russian economy. The splitting of the KGB into 
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five separate agencies by Yeltsin’s government in order to diminish the 
power of Soviet structures led unintentionally to the birth of protection 
markets in Russia. A great number of unemployed state security offic-
ers from the power structures (silovye struktury, e.g. security services, 
interior, and defense ministry) moved to the newly established private 
security agencies. 
These ‘violence-managing agencies’ such as criminal groups, private 
protection companies, and police and security forces acting as private 
entrepreneurs took over many of the functions of the unstable Russian 
state and, therefore, were an inherent part of post-Soviet Russian state-
building. For a beginner businessman, they were a more effective option 
for settling disputes than turning to the state.
The tightening of competition in the protection business created 
new informal rules in the turmoil. Some criminal groups were pushed 
out of the markets, but many were integrated into the local economies 
and politics. Former criminal leaders became managing directors, who 
employed public relations consultants to polish their public image. 
Stabilization of the environment made resorting to violence unprofit-
able and offered the Russian state a chance to regain the monopoly of 
force that it had lost under Yeltsin’s rule. Ultimately, the violent entre-
preneurs paved the way for Putin’s government and the strengthening 
of the Russian state in the 2000s.
In short, according to Volkov, organized crime did not capture the 
Russian state but participated – without being conscious of it – in the 
creation of an order within chaos. Thereby the violent entrepreneurs 
were actors in the state-building process of post-Soviet Russia, during 
which they were transformed from thugs into economic actors. 
All in all, while Volkov’s (2002) work stresses the civilizing effect 
of the markets, Ledeneva (2006) paints a darker picture of contempo-
rary Russian business life. According to her, ‘every legal firm or struc-
ture is forced (in order to preserve itself) to engage in underground 
financial scheming, usually having to do with its ownership struc-
ture, concealed profits, and multiple accounting systems’ (Ledeneva 
2006: 160). 
A mediating view between Volkov and Ledeneva, though closer to the 
latter, was offered by a St. Petersburg businessman from whom I asked 
at the end of 2006 if it is possible to conduct business strictly according 
to the laws and other official regulations. The reply was ‘it is complex, 
but possible’ (slozhno, no mozhno). 
Both Ledeneva’s (2006) and Volkov’s (2002) studies deal mainly with 
the 1990s, and the development during the Putin–Medvedev era requires 
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new empirical research. For the purposes of this book it is important to 
note that neither blat, nor barter, nor corruption debates are the whole 
truth about the role of social networks in the Soviet Union or today’s 
Russia. The various ways of networking find themselves rather on a 
continuum ranging from illegal or immoral to completely legal and 
moral ways of action. It is the latter that the remaining chapters of this 
book will discuss.
